Politicians Reject Dark Deals: Transparency Curbs Cozy Interest Group Ties
Swedish lawmakers are significantly less willing to adopt policy proposals written by lobbyists when those dealings lack public scrutiny, a new study finds. The discovery matters because it shows transparency can reduce the capture of elected officials by special interests—a persistent concern for regulators and corporate governance.
Originaltitel: Political Judgment Above Transparency? Results From a Mixed Method Study About Politicians' Close Cooperation With Interest Organizations
<p>In what ways, if at all, does transparency influence how politicians cooperate with interest organizations? While there areconvincing normative arguments stressing the importance of transparency in politics, empirical evidence for how transparencyin practice affects how politicians reason regarding cooperating with interest organizations is scarce. In this article, I addressthis gap by conducting a mixed method survey experiment with 1659 Swedish politicians. The findings indicate that a lack oftransparency, as explored in this study, diminishes politicians' willingness to closely cooperate with interest organizations bysubmitting policy proposals drafted by these organizations. However, the central concern for most politicians, in both thetransparent and untransparent conditions, was whether they had exercised independent political judgment rather than blindlyaccepted the interest organization's suggestion. These results contribute to the literature by showing how a specific form oftransparency influences cooperation between politicians and interest groups, while also offering theoretical insights into thecritical role of political judgment in this cooperation.</p>