Philosopher Solves 40-Year Mystery in Rights Theory
A new paper cracks why people should care about universal rights, not just their own interests. The finding matters for policy-makers designing social contracts and for organizations building ethical frameworks—it shows how self-interest rationally leads to recognizing everyone's basic rights.
Originaltitel: Gewirthian Prudence, Generic Agency, and Moral Rights
<p>Much critical attention has been given to Alan Gewirth’s argument concerning agents’ move from prudential to moral right-claims. Less ink has been spilled on the question of why prudent agents should claim rights to goods needed by agents in general rather than to goods needed for the realization of their individual and particular purposes. In this paper, I intend to show that Gewirth’s concept of prudence makes it necessary for agents to identify with the role of a generic agent and that this identification provides them with rationally valid reasons not only to claim prudential rights to freedom and well-being but also to recognize a moral principle stating that all agents have these rights. More generally, my argument points to the central role played by the concept of prudence in his theory.</p>