Philosophers miss the mark on mental illness by ignoring patients themselves
A new paper argues that scholars analyzing psychiatric conditions like depersonalization rely too heavily on their own assumptions about what's humanly possible to experience—missing the mark entirely. The author, who has lived through these conditions, calls for mandatory collaboration with patients in research, a shift that could reshape how mental health is understood and treated across clinical and academic settings.
Originaltitel: Allegedly impossible experiences
<p>In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople’s testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they nevertheless cannot conceive of. </p><p>I look at influential texts in which philosophers attempt to analyze and understand depersonalization and thought insertion. They go astray because they keep using their own powers of conceivability as a guide to what is or is not humanly possible to experience. Several experiences labelled inconceivable and therefore impossible by these philosophers, are experiences I have had myself. </p><p>Philosophers and others would be less likely to make this mistake if they would converse and collaborate more with the madpeople concerned. When this is not feasible, they should nevertheless strive to keep an open mind. Fantastical fiction may have a role to play here, by showing how bizarre experiences may nevertheless be prima facie conceivable. </p>