Ethics study challenges science's use of lab animals for knowledge
A Cambridge philosopher argues that harming sentient creatures—including common lab worms—cannot be justified by the pursuit of knowledge alone. The work has implications for research funding, institutional review boards, and how biotech companies design studies that use animals.
Originaltitel: The Wrong Motives for Potentially Harming a Being
<p>I aim to make progress on the following question: When is it morally wrong to risk harming another being? I will pay special attention to the use of the roundworm Caenorhabditis elegans (C. elegans), but my points are relevant to other situations and beings. I focus on the motive or purpose for exposing a being to risk of harm. I argue that it is morally wrong to potentially harm a being for the sake of others’ positive well-being or for a purported good such as knowledge (that is, knowledge for its own sake). The practical ramifications include that there is a moral hurdle of justification for potentially harming another being, and the justification cannot be others’ positive well-being or a good such as knowledge. Essentially, if the use of a being can be morally justified, it needs to be justified based on reducing enough ill-being or unpleasantness. One should recognise the creation and use of beings as a moral issue and view any warranted potential harm as a regrettable lesser evil. If feasible, it is desirable to use alternative methods that carry less risk and do not involve potentially sentient beings.</p>