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Economics 4.5

Minority governments are stable and effective, not crisis politics

A new analysis debunks the myth that minority governments signal political breakdown. Research shows they function well in stable democracies like Scandinavia and Canada, using strategic coalition bargaining to pass legislation. For business decision-makers, this means understanding minority governments as predictable political arrangements, not sources of instability.

Originaltitel: Legislative coalition bargaining under minority governments

Abstrakt

<p>The notion that minority cabinets generally indicate crisis and political instability is outdated. Minority cabinets are prevalent in high-quality democracies such as those in Scandinavia, Canada and New Zealand. However, minority cabinet parties need to bargain constantly with non-governmental parties to form legislative coalitions to pass their policy programmes. Kaare Strøm's seminal work on minority governments has inspired extensive research on their strategies, functions and effects. This chapter first examines the rationality behind forming minority governments and then provides an empirical cross-country overview, identifying patterns in their formation. It explores various bargaining strategies minority cabinets use to build legislative coalitions, including ad hoc coalition building and formalized support agreements. These strategies impact the performance of minority cabinets, including the policy benefits for cabinet and opposition parties, their cabinet stability and representativeness. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the current state of research, identifying gaps and suggesting directions for future studies.</p>

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