Island Democracies Face a Paradox: Closeness Breeds Both Better Representation and Corruption
Researchers interviewing lawmakers in São Tomé & Príncipe found that small island states gain democratic advantages from tight-knit communities—constituents have direct access to MPs. But that same intimacy enables patronage networks and vote-buying that undermine institutional integrity, forcing policymakers to rethink governance models for island nations.
Originaltitel: “Somos Todos Primos” (We’re All Cousins) in São Tomé & Príncipe: Islandness, Closeness, and Democracy in a Small Island State
This article explores how members of parliament (MPs) in the small island state of São Tomé & Príncipe (STP) understand the effects of islandness and smallness on their country’s democracy. Drawing on interviews with MPs from all political parties in the National Assembly in 2024, we find broad agreement that smallness and islandness offer certain democratic advantages, particularly by fostering close contact between representatives and voters, which helps MPs respond more directly to constituents’ needs. Yet, this same proximity also brings profound challenges. MPs describe how closeness facilitates corruption, patronage, and vote-buying, while friendship and kinship ties shape appointments to key institutions, undermining the rule of law. Across interviews, MPs repeatedly invoked the expression “Somos Todos Primos” (“We’re all cousins”), a local expression that doubles as a playful rephrasing of the country’s acronym, STP. This phrase captures both the intimacy and the entanglement of political and personal relations that characterize life and democratic governance in São Tomé & Príncipe. Within such a tightly knit society, political decision-making often occurs outside or between formal democratic institutions. Building on these findings, the article advances a theoretical refinement by integrating Putnam’s (1994) work on social capital with Corbett and Veenendaal’s (2018) analysis of small states. We argue that social capital in small island societies may be both particularly potent and unusually fragile. When political leaders use personal ties responsibly, hyper-personalisation can reinforce social trust and contribute to a virtuous cycle of democratic strengthening. When used irresponsibly, however, these same ties undermine social capital and weaken democratic practice.