Why Gold Works in Some Embassies but Fails in Others
Researchers have cracked the code on diplomatic style: the same golden decorations appear legitimate in egalitarian democracies but excessive in autocracies—because legitimacy depends on alignment with a nation's core values, not universal rules. For policymakers and organizations navigating international relations, this suggests that soft power strategies must be tailored to match a country's stated identity.
Originaltitel: The good and the gold: moral frameworks in the practice of diplomatic aesthetics
Why do some displays of gold in diplomacy appear legitimate while others are judged excessive or inauthentic? This article develops a framework for analyzing the moral foundations of diplomatic aesthetics. Drawing on Charles Taylor’s notion of hypergoods and integrating it with practice theory in International Relations, it conceptualizes diplomatic aesthetics as material and visual practices whose legitimacy rests not only on procedural appropriateness but also on alignment with deeper moral commitments and shared background knowledge about what is considered “proper,” “authentic” or “excessive” in diplomacy. Hypergoods and practical competence are therefore treated as intertwined. The analysis builds on interviews and photo elicitation with Swedish diplomats, civil servants, politicians and representatives of the Royal Court. It identifies two sets of hypergoods that orient Swedish understandings of diplomatic aesthetics: authenticity and restraint, and inclusion and equality. In Swedish settings, gilding is legitimized through its association with these values, allowing it to coexist with an egalitarian self-identity. By contrast, similar ornamentation in autocratic contexts, such as Russia, is widely interpreted as projecting hierarchy and domination. The article contributes by introducing hypergoods as an analytical lens for studying legitimacy in diplomacy and by shifting empirical attention to the perspectives of those who stage diplomatic aesthetics. It further shows how moral vocabularies function as boundary-drawing resources through which some aesthetic performances are authorized as tasteful and legitimate while others are dismissed as vulgar, derivative or morally suspect.